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Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign
Bribery: The Emergence of a New
International Legal Consensus
David A. Gantz*
[E]ffective efforts at all levels to combat and avoid corruption and
bribery in all countries are essential elements of an improved interna-
tional business environment, ... enhance fairness and competitive-
ness in international commercial transactions and form a critical part
of promoting transparent and accountable governance, economic and
social development and environmental protection in all countries .... i
Only recently has the international community recognized that foreign
bribery is a serious problem not only for international business activities but
as a threat to democratic government and economic development. Until a
few years ago, the United States, through legislation known as the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), 2 was the only major trading nation to
make it a criminal offense for its own firms and individuals to make certain
"corrupt" payments to foreign government officials illegal under its own
law rather than illegal under the foreign law.
Bribes remain a common if unfortunate feature of international busi-
ness activity in many parts of the world. Given this fact, the risk that U.S.
business activities abroad will be subject to criminal penalties in the United
States, while their competitors in Germany, France, Japan, Korea and other
. Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, University of Arizona College of
Law; Associate Director, National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade.
1 United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commer-
cial Transactions, G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/191 (1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1043, 1046-47 (1997).2Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as amended
by Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2),
78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)).
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countries operate under no similar legal constraint, has greatly complicated
the participation of U.S. citizens and companies in the global economy. In
addition, this inequality distorts international trade, increases the cost of
economic development, and undermines democratic principles of govern-
ment.
Until recently, neither developed countries nor the major capital goods
importing developing countries or their citizens have shown much inclina-
tion to subject themselves to limitations similar to those incorporated in the
FCPA. In fact, some major capital goods exporting nations have actively
encouraged foreign bribery by their citizens by providing an income tax de-
duction for such foreign payments as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses. However, this situation is now changing. International financial
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") are tying financial assistance to the recipient government's will-
ingness and ability to control corruption.4 Private organizations such as the
International Chamber of Commerce and Transparency International are
encouraging their members to resist demands for corrupt payments abroad.5
Most significantly, in two major public international organizations, the
Organization of American States ("OAS") and the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), major steps are now be-
ing taken to deal with foreign bribery on a multilateral basis. International
agreements have been negotiated and signed in both organizations that cre-
ate binding international legal rules which, through national implementing
legislation, are designed to discourage such practices. 6 Thus, the toleration
of either the offering or acceptance of corrupt payments by capital goods
exporting and capital goods importing nations alike, and their individual
and corporate citizens, can no longer be taken for granted.
This article focuses on the two recently negotiated binding interna-
tional agreements dealing with foreign bribery, the Inter-American Con-
vention Against Corruption7 and the OECD Convention on CombatinI
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
3See infra Part VI.D.4 See infra Part III.A, and especially notes 75-79 and accompanying text. See also James
P. Wesberry Jr., International Financing Institutions Face the Corruption Eruption: If the
IFIs Put Their Muscle and Money Where Their Mouth is, the Corruption Eruption May be
Capped, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 498 (1998).
5For example, Transparency International's national chapter activities include anti-
corruption programs. See Beverly Earle, The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work Try the
Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 232 (1996). See also infra Parts IV.A & B.6See infra notes 7 and 8 and Parts V and VI.
7See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, Organization of
American States, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
8 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 37
I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention].
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Part I of the article begins with a review of the rationale and key legal ele-
ments of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Part II describes recent
efforts by the United States to convince other governments and firms of the
need for binding, enforceable and universally accepted rules against corrupt
payments to foreign public officials. Parts III and IV survey the activities
of various governmental organizations and major private sector groups that
support international efforts to effectively discourage foreign bribery, re-
spectively. The key sections, Parts V and VI, describe, analyze and critique
the two major international conventions, the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Finally,
Part VII discusses the further steps that must be taken to be sure that this re-
cent progress becomes a significant and effective deterrence to foreign brib-
ery.
I. THE RATIONALE FOR AND CONTENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT
The U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977
in a spirit of moral outrage against disclosures that certain large U.S. corpo-
rations had bribed foreign government officials in order to obtain business
in those countries, including a series of payments by Lockheed Corporation
in Japan, which resulted in the resignation and prosecution (in Japan) of the
Japanese Prime Minister.9 One U.S. government study conducted in the
1970s, showing illegal payments voluntarily disclosed to the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), revealed questionable or clearly illegal
payments by seventy-seven of ninety-seven responding companies; the
payments ranged in size from $13,349 to $56.7 million over a period of
years.'0 The expanding and somewhat uncontrollable activities of multina-
tional corporations, the post-Watergate mood in the United States, and the
moral tone of the Carter Administration all put pressure on the U.S. Con-
gress to enact the FCPA." As one scholar has suggested, "The FCPA es-
sentially reflects the view that corruption, and in particular, its subset
bribery, is so immoral that not even the loss of business by American com-
panies could justify it.'
21
9 See JYOTI N. PRASAD, IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S.
EXPORT 35-37 (1993).
t0 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., SEC
REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm.
Print 1976), quoted in PRASAD, supra note 9, at 35-37.
" PRASAD, supra note 9, at 34-35; see also GEORGE C. GREANIS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 17-31 (1982) (reviewing the
statute's origins).
"2 Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 123 (1996). For a discussion of the moral and ethical issues of
bribery in the developing world, see Jennifer Daehler, Professional Versus Moral Responsi-
bility in the Developing World, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229, 245-50 (1995).
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A. Principal Elements of the FCPA
Under the FCPA, it is unlawful for a United States "domestic concern,"
which is defined as an individual who is a citizen, national or resident of the
United States or any corporation or other business association organized
under the laws of a state or with its principal place of business in the United
States 13 or an issuer of the securities thereof,' through the use of any means
of interstate commerce, including telephone, facsimile, telex, mails, and
courier service, to:
(1) pay or offer to pay money or anything of value "corruptly," di-
rectly or indirectly, to
(2) a foreign government official, political party, party official,
political candidate or intermediary for such person,
(3) while knowing or having reason to know - including a "high
probability of knowledge" - that the purpose of the payment was to
influence an official act or official decision,
(4) designed to assist in obtaining or retaining business.15
The FCPA also requires firms that are subject to reporting require-
ments under the U.S. securities laws to keep books and records "in reason-
able detail" so as to adequately reflect corporate transactions, and to
improve internal accounting controls to assure that financial transactions
can be properly accounted for.16 These accounting requirements are de-
signed to make it difficult or impossible for companies to maintain "slush
funds" for illegal purposes or otherwise conceal illicit payments in legiti-
mate accounts.
The FCPA does not effectively apply to foreign subsidiaries or affili-
ates of U.S. firms, although it does apply to U.S. citizens, employees or di-
rectors who meet the knowledge requirements of circumstances that suggest
illicit activities, e.g., awareness of a "high probability of the existence of
such circumstance. . 17 While the coverage of the FCPA is broad, there
are exceptions. The FCPA excludes from coverage the facilitating or
"grease" payments for "routine government actions" by foreign officials,
such as obtaining permits, licenses and official documents, provision of ba-18
sic utilities, etc. Two affirmative defenses to charges under the FCPA
exist: first, legality of the payment under the law of the host country,19 and
3See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994).
1415 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
"5See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a) to -2(a).
1615 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(b)(2)-(1)-(2) (1997). For a brief
discussion of the provisions of the FCPA, see David A. Gantz, The Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act: Professional and Ethical Challenges for Lawyers, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
97, 104-09 (1997).
17Michael D. Nilsson, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 AM. CiUM. L. REv. 803, 809
n.53 (1996).
1815 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (1994).
'915 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1).
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second, payment for travel and lodging arising out of promotional activities
aimed at obtaining or retaining new business.20 The legal payment excep-
tion is a narrow one, however. It applies only to actions expressly permit-
ted under local law; the failure of the foreign government to enforce local
anti-bribery laws does not constitute a defense.
The legal basis for the United States to exercise criminal jurisdiction
outside the territory of the United States is the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. 2 In the context of foreign bribery, it seems unlikely that there
could be any otherwise covered illicit activity involving a U.S. concern or
person that did not in some way utilize "the mails or any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce" such as the telephone, facsimile, telex,
mails and/or courier service for communications, funds transfers or the
like.
23
B. The FCPA as a Unilateral Approach to Foreign Bribery
The FCPA has been criticized on many occasions because today, as in
1977, the United States is the only major nation that effectively punishes its
natural and corporate citizens under its own laws for bribing the govern-
ment officials of other nations. The FCPA thus puts U.S. concerns and
their U.S. citizen employees at a substantial disadvantage in competing
abroad for the sale of goods and services in certain countries.24 Studies
have indicated that seventy percent of U.S. firms believe that the unilateral
restrictions applicable to U.S. firms under the FCPA result in at least some
decrease in overseas sales.25 However, the FCPA has also been attacked for
other reasons beyond the competitive disadvantage to U.S. firms. For ex-
ample, the FCPA has been criticized for vagueness. Because the FCPA is a
criminal statute that is imprecise, it has arguably created a "chilling effect"
on U.S. firms and individuals that may not only discourage illegal bribery
abroad but may also discourage legitimate transactions. 6 Undoubtedly,
there are some U.S. firms and individuals that, because of high moral stan-
dards or excessive caution, simply refuse to do business in areas such as the
Middle East or Mexico in order to avoid being exposed to questionable
2015 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2).
21H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 100-576, at 556 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,
1589.22Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
2315 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a).
24See, e.g., Christopher L. Hall, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive Dis-
advantage, But for How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 289, 303-06 (1994).
25 PRASAD, supra note 9, at 115.
26See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 230, 262-65 (1997) (asserting that the
vagueness of the FCPA creates "compliance anxiety" in gray area situations); Klich, supra
note 12, at 133 (asserting that the FCPA fails to effectively distinguish between government
officials and private individuals, especially with regard to transitional economies).
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business activities, 27 although there is a dearth of statistical evidence to
quantify such assertions.
A debate over the wisdom of punishing U.S. firms for bribery of for-
eign officials is not particularly useful in the context of this article. While
skeptics may continue to exist, insofar as the author has been able to ascer-
tain, there is no evidence of any interest in Congress or the Executive
Branch, after the 1988 efforts,28 in making further attempts to eliminate am-
biguities or vagueness, let alone the underlying criminalization of the tar-
geted activity. Moreover, once the United States ratifies the Inter-American
Convention and the OECD Convention, the United States will be under a
binding international legal obligation to punish foreign bribery through na-
tional legislation.29 Therefore, the FCPA, with some minor modifications
needed to comply with the two Conventions, will probably remain a part of
U.S. law for the foreseeable future.
C. Assessing the Extent and Costs of Foreign Bribery
Unfortunately, there appears to have been no significant reduction in
foreign bribery, even by U.S. firms, in the nearly twenty years since the
FCPA was enacted, presumably due to continued intense competition with
non-U.S. firms to obtain foreign sales. Knowledgeable observers have as-
serted that the FCPA has "deterred corrupt practices in the conduct of inter-
national business by U.S. firms,"30 but the case remains unproven. There is
evidence that the legal and accounting professions have made significant ef-
forts to ensure compliance by their U.S. firm clients.3' However, this does
not mean that foreign bribery by U.S. firms has been eliminated or reduced
to insignificant levels. Rather, bribery by U.S. firms of foreign officials
"may be surfacing as a significant problem for the first time in 20 years,"
27See Gantz, supra note 16, at 99.
2815 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994). In 1988, amendments to the FCPA were enacted
in part to specify a new and clearer knowledge standard. "When knowledge of the existence
of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person
actually believes that such circumstance does not exist." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B). One
may well question whether this language represents a significant improvement. The 1988
amendments serve to clarify ambiguities relating to the determination as to whether a bribe
was made for the purpose of obtaining, retaining or directing business, and is thus action-
able. See Salbu, supra note 26, at 245-46.
2 9See infra Parts V, VI.
30Jay M. Vogelson, Report of the ABA Committee on Corrupt Practices to the ABA, 30
INT'L LAW. 194, 196 (1996).
3 1See Vogelson, supra note 30, at 196. The ABA's Task Force on Foreign Corrupt
Practices of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice has provided the impetus for
obtaining formal ABA support for ABA House of Delegates recommendations supporting
national and international efforts to deter corruption, and disseminates information through
publications and seminars. See, e.g., Lucinda A. Low & Claire S. Wellington, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Avoiding the Pitfalls, PREVENTIvE L. REP., Spring 1994, at 13.
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according to SEC enforcement officials describing recent investigations.32
For example, the SEC has recently reached agreement with Triton Energy
Corp., which agreed to pay a $300,000 penalty to settle allegations that a
subsidiary bribed Indonesian government officials in 1989-90. 3 This is the
first major prosecution since action was taken against Lockheed Corpora-
tion in 1994 for bribing an Egyptian legislator.3 Other investigations by
the SEC, which enforces the accounting provisions of the FCPA, and by the
Justice Department, which is responsible for enforcement of the criminal
bribery provisions, are continuing.35 Moreover, while domestic bribery
within the United States is not perceived to be a major problem, a recent
survey suggests that some nations are less corrupt than the United States,
although the United States still ranks among the least corrupt.
36
Globally, the corruption problem remains disturbingly common and
socially, economically, and politically damaging. Such illicit activities are
not limited to the newly emerging Asian markets such as China, Indonesia,
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines,37 to key Latin American markets
such as Venezuela, Brazil38 and Mexico, 39 to African nations such as Nige-
ria,40 or to Russia and other transitional economies 41 where it remains an
endemic concern. As recent developments in Italy 42 and Germany 43 have
confirmed, corruption remains a global phenomenon, as highly corrupt
32Neil Roland, U.S. Firm May Feel Need to Bribe Overseas, COM. APPEAL, Mar. 6,
1997, at B4 (quoting SEC Enforcement Director William McLucas).
33See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., et al, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,405 (D.D.C. Feb.
27, 1997). For a discussion of the Triton Energy Corp. decision, see Arthur F. Mathews,
Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate Internal
Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlement, 18 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 303 (1998).
34Andy Pasztor, Lockheed Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Violate Anti-Bribery Regula-
tions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1995, at B6.35Roland, supra note 32, at B4; see also Salbu, supra note 26, at 236-37.
36See Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 1997 (visited Dec. 12,
1997) <http://wwv.transparency.de/press/1997.31.7.cpi.htrnl> (out of fifty-two nations,
Denmark tops the list as the least corrupt nation, while the United States ranks as the six-
teenth least corrupt nation).
37Louis Kraar, How Corrupt is Asia?, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 1995, at 26.
38 See John Mintz & Paul Blustein, Raytheon's $1.4 Billion Brazil Pact in Doubt, WASH.
POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at E-3.39See Payments May Smooth Rout of Illicit Fruit to Mexico, J. COM., Mar. 26, 1996, at
IA.40Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 1997, supra note 36, sug-
gests that Nigeria is perceived by Transparency International's respondents to be the most
corrupt of the 52 countries surveyed.
41 Klich, supra note 12, at 133-40.
42Lawrence Ingrassia & Maureen Line, Italy's Drive to Reform Runs Into a Problem:
Corruption Lingers On, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1996, at Al.43Say No to Competitive Bribing, WALL ST. J. (European ed.), Apr. 15, 1996, at 6.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:457 (1998)
countries are found on all five major continents, 44 and it is worth remem-
bering that almost two-thirds of direct foreign investment is by firms based
in one developed country investing in another developed country.45
Widespread bribery continues despite broad international recognition
that such corruption causes misallocation of resources, particularly in de-
veloping nations, "where funds originally intended for schools and hospitals
are siphoned off as bribes to public officials and channeled into projects of
lesser importance. 46 It distorts normal market forces, depriving purchasing
countries of the best products at the lowest prices, and thus adversely im-
pacts economic development. For example, an independent consultant has
estimated that corruption in China adds five percent to operating costs.47
The World Bank estimates that if bribes equal only five percent of foreign
investment into developing countries - probably a conservative figure -
the bribes would total nearly $80 billion per year.4S
International business executives reportedly consider corruption to be
the major obstacle to doing business in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America
and the Caribbean.49 The risks to a foreign company from subsequent pub-
lic disclosure of an illegal payment are even more difficult to quantify, but
exist regardless of whether the bribes are punishable in the foreign com-
pany's country of incorporation or principal place of business.50 An IMEF
study suggests a direct (inverse) correlation between the level of corruption
prevalent in a country and the level of investment as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product; for example, Singapore has a low level of corruption and
a high level of investment as a percentage of GDP, and Thailand and Haiti
both have a high level of corruption and a relatively low level of invest-
ment.51 Of course, many factors other than corruption affect investment
"Transparency International, supra note 36. Transparency International's list identifies
Nigeria, Bolivia, Colombia, Russia, Pakistan, Mexico, Indonesia, India, Venezuela, and
Vietnam as the 10 most corrupt countries of the world. The 10 least corrupt are said to be
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Australia, Sin-
gapore and Luxembourg.
45
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 1997: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION
POLICY, at 11, U.N. Sales No. E.97.II.D.10 (1997) [hereinafter UNCTAD REPORT].
46 Catherine Yannaca-Small, Battling International Bribery, OECD OBSERVER, Feb-Mar.
1995, at 16.47Kraar, supra note 37, at 26 (quoting Political & Economic Risk Consultancy, Ltd., a
Hong Kong-based firm that analyzes corruption and political stability).
48Guy de Jonquieres & John Mason, Goodbye to Mr. 10%, FIN. TIMES (London), July 22,
1997.
49Id.
5 Subsequent public disclosure of an illegal payment most commonly occurs after a new
government decides to investigate the activities of its predecessors in an attempt to discredit
or even imprison them.
51Paul Blustein, Pssst... Here's a Little Something That Seems to Slow Growth, WASH.
POST, July 17, 1996, at DI (referring to a study by Paolo Mauro of the IMF). The study also
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levels, and some countries, such as China and Mexico, have been very suc-
cessful in attracting foreign investment despite perceived high levels of cor-
ruption.
The United Nations has recognized the incompatibility of corruption,
not only with fairness and competitiveness in the international business en-
vironment, but also with modem economic and social goals and effective
government5 3 The United States, while focusing on international business
and competitiveness issues, also recognizes that foreign corruption is more
than just a business environment issue. As Hattie Babbit, U.S. Ambassador
to the OAS, has asserted, corruption "is also a rule of law issue. Corruption
saps the strength of democratic institutions, whether it exists in old estab-
lished democracies or in newly created ones struggling to demonstrate their
legitimacy.",4
For these reasons, despite the potentially anti-competitive impact of the
FCPA on U.S. exporters, some observers have argued that the FCPA is an
excellent example of U.S. efforts to promote free trade and open competi-
tion.55 In any event, U.S. efforts to obtain effective global mechanisms to
stem foreign corruption have become a major aspect of U.S. foreign eco-
nomic policy.
II. UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO GLOBALIZE SANCTIONS AGAINST
FOREIGN BRIBERY
A. Articulation of U.S. Views and the U.S. Challenge
Whether wise or unwise, the FCPA has long been a political reality in
the United States. Thus, for competitive as much as or more than for politi-
cal and moral reasons, the U.S. government has long sought international
rules criminalizing bribery of foreign officials by all capital goods-
exporting countries in order to level the playing field. Mickey Kantor, for-
mer U.S. Trade Representative and Secretary of Commerce, has termed for-
eign bribery an unfair tariff barrier which reduces U.S. exports and costs
U.S. jobs: "From April 1994 to May 1995, the U.S. government learned of
almost 100 cases in which foreign bribes undercut U.S. firms' ability to win
notes that nations may do well in attracting investment notwithstanding corruption if their
economies are well managed in other ways. Id.
5 2See Richard Lawrence, Emerging Nations Attract Flood of Equity Capital, J. COM.,
Jan. 31, 1997, at IA.
53 United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commer-
cial Transactions, supra note 1.
"'Ambassador Hattie Babbitt, Remarks to the American Bar Association Conference on
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Feb. 21, 1997) (on file with the Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business).55Say No to Competitive Bribing, supra note 43.
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contracts valued at $45 billion., 56 U.S. Commerce Department officials
claim that during the past three years, foreign firms paid roughly $80 mil-
lion in bribes to officials in other countries, depriving U.S. firms of an un-
specified value of sales.57 In fact, U.S. efforts to multilateralize sanctions
against foreign bribery began far before the days of the Clinton Admini-
stration, with a series of discussions under United Nations auspices begin-
ning in the late 1970s that broke down in 1981.8 Yet, little progress has
been achieved until very recently, and it remains to be seen whether the
promising developments in the OAS, the OECD, and elsewhere will ulti-
mately result in a significant reduction in bribery of foreign officials, or at
least place U.S. companies in a more competitive position when doing
business abroad.
The establishment of binding international legal agreements that re-
quire nations to punish foreign bribery as a crime under the home country's
laws has been a daunting task for the U.S. government. It is evident that
there is no customary international law or international legal practice 9 sup-
porting the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign illicit pay-
ments. International custom, to the extent any exists, suggests that
corruption of government officials is subject to discipline only by the coun-
try whose officials are being bribed. Moreover, as the current controversy
over U.S. efforts to pressure other states to join the U.S. embargoes on
Cuba (the "Helms-Burton" legislation) and Iran (Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act) suggest, any new exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly if
advocated by the United States, potentially causes great concern among
major U.S. trading partners and allies.60
5 6Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A10 (quoting Mickey Kantor and reporting that bribers allegedly
won contracts 80% of the time).
5 7Richard Lawrence, U.S., 33 Other Nations Sign Pact Against Business Bribes, J. COM.,
Dec. 18, 1997, at 2A.58See generally U.N. Draft Convention on Illicit Payments (on file with Northwestern
Journal of International Law & Business) (requiring parties to make bribery of government
officials a criminal offense in their own territories (art. 1) and to punish foreign bribery by
their nationals when "any act aiding or abetting that offense, is connected with the territory
of that state." (art. 4)).
59
See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 1993)
(discussing the manner in which legal principles are established through international cus-
tom).
6 See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified as 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091) [hereinafter Helms-Burton];
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996). The
European Union challenged the legality of Helms-Burton in the World Trade Organization's
Dispute Settlement Body. EU Foreign Ministers Push Ahead with Protesting US. Helms-
Burton Law, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at D3 (Oct. 2, 1996). In its annual assessment of for-
eign trade barriers, U.S. extraterritorial and unilateral trade measures were cited as "the most
troubling features of U.S. policy." INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 1, 1997, at 22. An interim set-
tlement was reached between the European Union and the United States in May 1997.
European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-
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Progress has also been agonizingly slow in recent years partly because
there remains considerable reluctance in many international groups to even
discuss the problem. For example, the United States has not yet obtained
the consent of western hemisphere trade ministers to discuss government
corruption in the context of efforts to create a Free Trade Area of the
Americas by 2005. Mexico, in particular, has opposed the inclusion of this
issue on grounds that it is a political rather than a trade matter.61 Similarly,
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") has declined to treat foreign cor-
ruption as a trade problem, despite strong U.S. pressure. 62 The Ministerial
Declaration of the WTO meeting of trade ministers held in Singapore on
December 9-13, 1996, does not mention the corruption problem; even the
section that creates a working group on investment and competition issues
is silent on the subject.63 In the WTO discussions, the government of the
Philippines, generally considered to be one of the more corrupt nations in
the vorld,64 rejected the U.S. proposal outright, expressing a preference for
a "simple code of conduct" among the United States, the European Union
and Japan and suggested that "unique cultures and traditions.., must be re-
spected by individual governments .... ,,65 Nevertheless, some developing
countries, which may be unable or unwilling to enforce their existing inter-
nal criminal legislation prohibiting bribery of their own officials, have at
the same time denounced the laissez-faire policies of all developed nations
except the United States in seeking to restrain the illegal activities abroad of
their own citizens.6 6 This has led some to argue that "bribery is an intransi-
Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, Apr. 11, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 529 (1997).
However, that settlement is in question because of more recent U.S. threats to sanction
French, Russian, and Malaysian firms for their alleged violations of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act. Brittan Warns of WTO Case if French Firm Sanctioned under Iran Law,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 12, 1997, at 3. Mexico and Canada have sought consultations re-
garding Helms-Burton under NAFTA's Chapter 20. U.S. Agrees to Talks with Canada,
Mexico on Helms-Burton Sanctions Measure, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 476 (Mar. 20,
1996). On May 18, 1998, President Clinton announced that he would waive trade sanctions
against European firms that invest in Iran. Albright: US. To Waive Iran Sanctions On All
E.U Firms, Dow Jones News Serv. (May 18, 1998), available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus da-
tabase.
61Kevin G. Hall, Trade Leaders Take Off Their Gloves in Cartagena, J. COM., Mar. 22,
1996, at IA.
62There has been some consideration of the issue as part of negotiations relating to gov-
emnment procurement. U.S. to Raise Labor, Corruption Issues at WTO Singapore Ministe-
rial, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at D4 (Apr. 1, 1996).
6 3See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 218, 226 (1997).
64The Philippines is ranked the fortieth most corrupt nation out of fifty-two nations.
Transparency International, supra note 36.6
1 Philippines Rejects US. Proposal for WTO Accord on Bribery, Corruption, Int'l Trade
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gent global reality that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon,', 67 and that ef-
fective measures to combat it are doomed to failure.
B. Critique of the FCPA Approach
Arguments have also been made that the FCPA approach, criminaliz-
ing foreign bribery by a state's own citizens, is not likely to be appropriate
or effective either as national policy or as a basis for international agree-
ments. At least one scholar has argued that "market mechanisms" coupled
with private codes of conduct and local government commitments against
bribery, along with the transparency that would result from the de-
criminalizing of foreign bribery in the national's home country, can provide
an investment climate that strongly discourages corruption, without the
need for severe statutes such as the FCPA or international agreements.68 It
is suggested that the elimination of the FCPA and the absence of similar
legislation enacted by other capital goods exporting nations would also
eliminate troublesome aspects of extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. laws
and the implications of "moral imperialism" that are attached to efforts by
capital goods exporting nations to impose their concepts of behavior on
cultures in which bribery may be an accepted form of activity.69 Therefore,
it could be preferable for the United States to abandon the FCPA and its ef-
forts to convince other nations to enact similar legislation and instead,
"maintain domestic bribery laws and work in the global marketplace to per-
suade other nations to adopt and vigorously enforce laws that criminalize
bribery within their own borders."70
C. Can Reliance on Local Enforcement Resolve the Problem?
The problem with eliminating criminalization of bribery under the laws
of the exporter/investor's home country, and relying on better enforcement
of anti-bribery laws in the country where the investment/import occurs, or
in public pressure in the global marketplace, is that historically this ap-
proach has not been successful. U.S. firms, after all, are the only ones who
have been operating under FCPA-type constraints. While in theory, legal
constraints on corruption from the "demand" side, that is the foreign offi-
cial, should be effective, this has not proved to be the case. Capital goods
exporting firms of other nationalities are currently regulated only by anti-
corruption laws in the foreign jurisdictions in which they are doing busi-
ness, and strong evidence 7' suggests that many countries, not solely those in
the developing world, are unwilling or unable to enforce domestic anti-
bribery legislation against their own government officials. In some poorer




71 See supra Part I.C.
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nations, if a foreign company is prepared to offer large sums of money to
secure a project, the government of the country_ may have a difficult time
preventing key officials from being tempted. 2 To a very great extent,
therefore, abandonment of U.S.-led efforts to make foreign bribery a crimi-
nal offense in the capital goods exporting nation, for international control of
the "supply" side, would be an endorsement of the status quo under which
U.S. firms are legally constrained from offering bribes, but those from all
other jurisdictions are limited only by voluntary undertakings, or by the
(in)effectiveness of local law enforcement.
Consequently, the United States has continued its efforts, perhaps re-
alizing that in this process of multilateralizing rules against corruption the
only losers are a relatively few corrupt officials and firms whose exports in
the world market are competitive only on the basis of pay-offs rather than
on the basis of offering quality products at reasonable cost. Everyone else
benefits, including the United States and other capital goods exporting
countries and their corporate citizens, and the peoples of the developing
world who have been paying a corruption "tax" for decades.
The United States, a voice in the wilderness on the issue for some
years, has in recent years found support not only in the OAS and the OECD
but also in an increasing number of public and private international organi-
zations and groups.7 3 These entities share the credit for the significant steps
toward dealing with foreign bribery that have been taken by governments
during the past several years.
I. THE WORLD BANK, THE UNITED NATIONS, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. Efforts of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
The concerns that have led the United States, the OAS, and now the
OECD members to seek to prevent corrupt foreign payments generally ap-
ply with equal or greater force to the multilateral lending institutions, such
as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank group). 74 The siphoning of government assistance funds channeled
through international development banks is effectively the use of public
money, rather than individual or corporate assets, for illicit activities. The
World Bank in recent years has sought to discourage the use of bank funds
for illicit foreign payments by providing that proposals for awards will be
rejected and loans will be canceled if it determines that corrupt practices are
72See Earle, supra note 5, at 223.73See infra Parts V, VI.
74The World Bank group consists of five institutions: the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation; the International
Development Association; the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID); and the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHI-ATA, 2
THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 1 n. 1 (1995).
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engaged in by representatives of the borrower or a beneficiary of the loan.75
The World Bank also declared its intention to demand the right to inspect
suppliers' and contractors' accounts and records relating to performance of
the contract, to have World Bank-appointed auditors conduct audits, and to
bar a firm from eligibility for future contracts if it is determined to have en-
gaged in corrupt practices.76 The World Bank's Procurement and Consult-
ant Guidelines provide for a no-bribery pledge in the bid form, but only for
foreign governments that request it and that the World Bank believes will
take "robust measures to address the domestic causes of bribery".77
The World Bank and its sister agency, the IMF, have also adopted
formal procedures under which assistance to a developing country can be
suspended if government corruption is found to have an adverse effect on a
nation's economic development. 7' For example, in 1997, both the World
Bank and the IMF suspended funding to Kenya in the amounts of $71.6
million and $220 million, respectively, because the World Bank and the
IMF "both want to see some action on the government's part to show they
are sincere in reducing corruption, improving governance and following
economic reforms. 79 This unprecedented action by the international finan-
cial institutions could have a significant impact, particularly in many sub-
Saharan African countries, where private financing is still scarce. 0
B. Actions by the United Nations
In 1996, the U.N. General Assembly, largely at the instigation of the
United States, took a series of steps to condemn bribery of public officials.
First, the General Assembly adopted the International Code of Conduct for
Public Officials ("Code of Conduct").8 ' The Code of Conduct, while
avoiding the use of terms such as "bribery" or "corruption," bars transac-
tions that involve a conflict of interest and dictates that "public officials
shall not solicit or receive directly or indirectly any gift or other favour that
may influence the exercise of their functions, the performance of their du-
75
WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA CREDITS, §
1.15 (1995).76Id"
77 U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, Anti-Corruption Review, Part VI(A) (Dec. 1997)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/corr-rev.html>.
78 Global Pocketbook Pressure Paying Off World Bank and IMF Using Influence to
Curb Corruption, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1997, at 13. World Bank officials have indicated that
lending decisions to countries that are delinquent with regard to curbing bribery will be made
on a project-by-project basis. Id.
79 World Bank Cuts Aid to Kenya, Cites Corruption, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 12,
1997, at 6A.
8°Sub-Saharan Africa receives less than five percent of the world's net private capital
flows, compared with forty-five percent for East Asia and the Pacific. World Business: (4
Special Report): Fund Seekers, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 18, 1997, at R6.
"G.A. Res. 51/59, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/59 (1996), 36 I.L.M.
1039, 1040 (1996) (adopting a Code of Conduct for Public Officials).
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ties or their judgment. 82 The weakness of this effort is illustrated by the
operative language of the Resolution which "recommends" the Code to the
Member states "as a tool to guide their efforts against corruption.
8 3
The same General Assembly also adopted by consensus a much
broader and more detailed United Nations Declaration Against Corruption
in International Commercial Transactions ("Declaration").8 4 In the Decla-
ration, United Nations members commit themselves, inter alia:
To take effective and concrete action to combat all forms of corruption,
bribery and related illicit practices in international commercial transactions, in
particular to pursue effective enforcement of existing laws prohibiting bribery
in international commercial transactions, to encourage the adoption of laws for
those purposes where they do not exist, and to call upon private and public
corporations, including transnational corporations, and individuals within their
jurisdiction engaged in international commercial transactions to promote the
objectives of the present Declaration;
To criminalize such bribery of foreign officials in an effective and coor-
dinated manner, but without in any way precluding, impeding or delaying re-
gional or national actions to further the implementation of the present
Declaration. 5
Bribery is defined to include both the offering and the solicitation of
payments, gifts, and other advantages. The Declaration calls for the elimi-
nation of the tax deductibility of bribes, and the enactment of effective ac-
counting standards to encourage companies to avoid corruption. 6
While the Declaration reflects the usual U.N. General Assembly con-
cems over national sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction, and the need to
ensure that governmental actions to combat bribery are "consistent with the
principles of international law regarding the extraterritorial applications of a
State's laws,"87 on balance it is clearly a step forward in obtaining broad
international recognition and condemnation of the problem of foreign cor-
ruption. In further debates in other regional and global organizations, the
United Nations resolution may be useful in countering arguments from
Asian and other governments that multilateralization of bribery represents
cultural imperialism on the part of the United States.38 Moreover, a follow-
up General Assembly resolution in 1997 urged members, inter alia, to ratify
821d. Annex 1, 9 4, 35 I.L.M. at 1041-42.
3Id. 2, 35 I.L.M. at 1040.84 United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commer-
cial Transactions, supra note 1, 99 1, 2, 36 I.L.M. at 1046-47.
851d.861d. 4, 36 I.L.M. at 1047.
87
1d.
88Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Aug. 22, 1997).
The author spoke with this official, who has requested anonymity, on three separate occa-
sions: August 22, 1997, December 30, 1997 and April 3, 1998. Memoranda detailing the
substance of the interviews are on file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law
and Business.
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"where appropriate, international instruments against corruption" and, more
significantly, requested the U.N. Secretary General to seek a report from
each member on its implementation of the 1996 Declaration, as a possible
basis for later United Nations action.8 9
C. The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe's Multi-disciplinary Group on Corruption
("GMC") analyzed possible new criminal law provisions against the cor-
ruption of public officials, gaps in substantive and procedural law, and pro-
posals for remedying them in 1995.90 The rapporteur of the GMC
suggested, inter alia, that the Council of Europe adopt an international cor-
ruption convention along the lines of a draft prepared by the rapporteur. 91
The draft would not only have criminalized foreign corruption and required
cooperation and mutual assistance among the parties to the convention, but
would have required the parties to adopt national legislation which would
treat as null and void "any contract made in order to facilitate the receiving
of illicit payments or other illicit advantages, and create in each country a
'National Authority Against Corruption.'" 9 2 More recently, the Council of
Europe's Justice Ministers recommended the creation of a "process" to ef-
fectively prevent and combat organized crime and corruption; a draft penal
convention would apparently cover foreign bribery as well as organized
crime.93
D. The European Union
In May 1997, the European Union ("EU") concluded a draft conven-
tion against corruption. 94 This convention is designed to criminalize the of-
fer or receipt of corrupt payments with regard to public officials of EU
member countries and EU officials.95 However, the EU Convention is more
limited in scope than the Inter-American or OECD Conventions in that the
EU Convention would apply only within the EU. Moreover, it is subject to
ratification by the Member States (including new members) of the EU, but
is not open to non-members. 96 For example, bribery of a Brazilian govern-
89G.A. Res. 52/87, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., at 2,4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/87 (1997).
90New Criminal Law Provisions Against the Corruption of Public Officials, Council of
Europe: Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption (GMC), 14th Sess. 1 (1995).
91Id. at 18.
92Paolo Bernasconi, About the Necessity of an International Convention Preventing and
Combating the Corruption of Public Officials (Draft Summary), arts. 2, 6, 8, 10 (Nov. 1993).93U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, supra note 77, at Part III.B.94Convention Drawn Up on The Basis of Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on European
Union on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or
Officials of Member States of the European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 195) [hereinafter EU Con-
vention].
95Id. arts. 1-3, 37 I.L.M. at 15-16.96 1d. arts. 13, 14, 37 I.L.M. at 18-19.
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ment official by a French citizen would not be covered by the EU Conven-
tion,97 and neither Brazil nor other countries whose citizens or companies
are doing business in the European Union are eligible to accede to the EU
Convention. It is likely to be some time before the EU Convention enters
into force, since it will not be effective until all Member States have pro-
vided notice of ratification.9" Arguably, the European Union's actions will
have been superseded by the OECD Convention if that convention
promptly enters into force, and all current EU Member States become par-
ties.
The Council of the European Union has also discussed a "Draft Joint
Action" to make corruption in the private sector of EU nations a criminal
offense and to increase judicial cooperation."9
IV. EFFORTS OF PRIVATE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO
DISCOURAGE FOREIGN BRIBERY
While many believe that only actions of governments and public insti-
tutions can effectively respond to the problem of foreign bribery,'00 the
problem in the first instance rests with transnational corporations and other
private businesses and individuals that offer bribes to or are asked for bribes
by government officials. After all, private businesses, not governments or
international organizations, are responsible, directly or indirectly, for an
enormous investment component of international production, an estimated
$1.4 trillion-worth in 1996.01 In response to the concerns of the private
sector, several non-governmental organizations are now active in dealing
with the problem. Two major non-governmental agencies should share,
along with the U.S. government, much of the credit for increasing aware-
ness among the private sector, governments, and the public of the problems
created by foreign corruption. This awareness has caused major govern-
ments to finally take effective action against corruption.
A. The International Chamber of Commerce Code of Conduct
The International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), a private organiza-
tion with members in most major nations of the world, has been actively
engaged in dealing with extortion and bribery in business transactions since
97The definition of "official" is "any Community or national official, including any na-
tional official of another Member State." Id. art. I, para. (a), 37 I.L.M. at 15. Jurisdiction is
similarly limited. Id. art. 7, 37 I.L.M. at 16-17.
98Id. art. 13, paras. 2-3, 37 I.L.M. at 18.
99 U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, supra note 77.
100See supra Part II.A.
101 UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 45, at xvi. This figure includes foreign direct invest-
ment of $350 billion, along with loans by commercial banks, equity markets, public organi-
zations and internal sources.
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1977.102 Recently, the ICC has intensified its efforts with a review of its
1977 report that began in 1994 and was concluded in 1996.103 The ICC has
recognized that continuing scandals involving bribery and extortion
could undermine the most promising development of the post Cold-war era,
i.e., the spread of democratic governments and of market economies world-
wide. It is all the more unacceptable in view of the liberalisation of world trade
in goods and services achieved through the Uruguay Round: freer trade must
be matched by fair competition, failing which trading relations will be in-
creasingly strained to the common detriment of governments and enterprises.
In addition to being a crime, offering or giving bribes may constitute acts of
unfair competition, which could give rise to actions for damages.104
As a non-governmental organization representing private enterprises
which may be faced with competitive pressures to pay bribes, the ICC takes
a somewhat different view of the bribery problem, reflecting the concern
with "extortion" (the request) as well as "bribery" (the payment) and with
the "unfair competition" that the offering or soliciting of bribes may cre-
ate. 105
The ICC's 1996 revisions consist of two main parts, "Recommenda-
tions to Governments and International Organizations," ("Recommenda-
tions") and "Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery" ("Rules of
Conduct"). The Recommendations encourage international cooperation
among governments and the enactment of national preventive and enforce-
ment measures.10 6 The Recommendations are directed primarily at dealing
with bribery and extortion within the jurisdiction in which the corrupt pay-
ments are solicited or paid. While there is a recommendation for "interna-
tional cooperation", there is no explicit mention of criminalization of
foreign bribery, nor specific recommendations to the OECD which the ICC
notes "with approval... has urged governments to re-examine their legis-
lation against extortion and bribery."' 0 7 The ICC also urges the World
Trade Organization to "involve itself with these issues.' 0 8
The Rules of Conduct, in contrast, are directed to and designed solely
for adoption by private enterprises.' 09 The ICC "urged companies around
10"International Chamber of Commerce Commission on Ethical Practices Recommenda-
tions to Combat Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, Nov. 29, 1977, 17 I.L.M.
417 (1978).
103Ad Hoc Committee on Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions,
Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions (Revisions to the 1977 Report
and Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery), ICC Doc. No. 193/15, Mar. 26,
1996, at 1, 35 I.L.M. 1306, 1307 (1996) [hereinafter ICC Ad Hoc Committee Revisions].
1'4Id. at 6, 35 I.L.M. at 1307.
05Id
' 6Id. at 8-11, 35 I.L.M. at 1308-09.
'071d. at 8, 35 I.L.M. at 1308.
108Id.
109Id. at II (Part II - Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery), 35 I.L.M. at
1309 [hereinafter ICC Rules].
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the world to adopt Rules of Conduct which are designed to combat extor-
tion and bribery in international trade."' n The Rules of Conduct call for
conformance with the "relevant laws and regulations of the countries in
which they are established and in which they operate" as well as with the
letter and spirit of the Rules of Conduct."' They prohibit demanding or ac-
cepting a bribe ("extortion"),' 12 or offering a bribe or accepting a demand
("bribery and 'kickbacks'). 11 3 These prohibitions apply for any purpose,
not just for "obtaining or retaining business," as provided in the ICC's 1977
rules' 4 and in the FCPA.1
15
Recognizing the difficulties in dealing with agents, the Rules of Con-
duct provide that enterprises are to take measures to assure that payments
made to agents represent no more than appropriate remuneration, that no
part of such payments are used as bribes, and that appropriate records are
maintained. 16 All financial transactions should be "properly and fairly re-
corded"; secret accounts are prohibited and independent systems of auditing
should be established.1 7 Boards of directors are to take "reasonable steps
including the establishment and maintenance of proper systems of control"
to prevent illicit payments, review compliance and punish violations by di-
rectors or employees.' 18 Political contributions, which have become quite
sensitive in the United States, 19 are to be made only in compliance with
applicable laws, including requirements for disclosure.120 Finally, individ-
ual enterprises are encouraged to draw up their own internal codes, includ-
ing internal reporting requirements, policies, guidelines and training
programs.'
21
The ICC has also created a standing committee of business executives,
and lawyers to mobilize support for this exercise in "business self-
regulation"; this committee is to report on progress every two years. 22 It is
"0ICC Announces New Rules of Conduct to Fight Extortion and Bribery in Trade, Int'l
Trade Daily (BNA), at D3 (Mar. 28, 1996). The ICC will create a standing committee of
business executives, lawyers and academics to promote the new rules; the committee will
render a report on progress to the ICC biennially. Id.
1 ICC Rules, supra note 109, Basic Principle, 35 I.L.M. at 1309.
".Id. art. 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1309.
131d. art. 2, para (a), 35 I.L.M. at 1309.
1 4 ICC Ad Hoe Committee Revisions, supra note 103, at 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1307.
'See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994).
"6ICC Rules, supra note 109, art. 3, 35 I.L.M. at 1309.
171d. art. 4, 35 I.L.M. at 1309.
'Id. art. 5, 35 I.L.M. at 1310.
119See, e.g., Jeffrey Taylor et al., Democrats to Return More Murky Money, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 7, 1997, at Al0; Step Right Up: Bill Clinton Wants to Stay Aloof From the Excesses of
Democratic Fund Raising, TIME, Mar. 10, 1997, at 30.
120ICC Rules, supra note 109, art. 6, 35 I.L.M. at 1310.
2 1Id. art. 7,35 I.L.M. at 1310.
1221CC Press Release, Business Adopts Its Own Rules Against Extortion and Bribery,
(Mar. 27, 1996).
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an open question whether the ICC's actions can achieve significant success
in regulating private business behavior unless all or most of the capital
goods exporting countries outlaw foreign bribery. The United States's uni-
lateral experience with the FCPA does not inspire confidence.
B. Transparency International's Efforts to Highlight the Perception of
Corruption
A relatively new (1993) not-for-profit, non-governmental organization,
Transparency International, has been established to
curb corruption through international and national coalitions encouraging gov-
ernments to establish and implement effective laws, policies and anti-
corruption programs.... strengthen public support and understanding for anti-
corruption programs and enhance public transparency and accountability in
international business transactions and in the administration of public pro-
curement [and] encourage all parties to international business transactions to
operate at the highest levels of integrity .... 123
Transparency International has established offices in more than fifty
countries and has gained the support of major international corporations and
government agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment. 124 Transparency International promises to become a significant
player in private sector efforts to combat corruption through its annual pub-
lication of a "corruption index" listing countries in the order of their per-
ceived level of corruption in business dealings, and through its
encouragement of national chapter activities that foster anti-corruption pro-
grams.1
25
Certainly, Transparency International's efforts have contributed to the
heightened awareness of the pernicious nature of foreign bribery and the
new willingness of governments to address the problem through interna-
tional conventions at the OAS and the OECD.
V. THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
The first, historic, binding international agreement dealing with for-
eign corruption is the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption.
12 6
Twenty-two OAS member nations, including the United States, signed the
Inter-American Convention within a few months of its completion on
March 29, 1996.127 The Inter-American Convention entered into force on
'23 Transparency International, Our Mission and Strategy (visited Aug. 22, 1997)
<http://www.transparency.de/introducing-timission.html>.
124 On the Path to Honesty International Corruption Finds an Important Ally in a New
Organization, FRESNO BEE, July 15, 1996, at B4.
12 5See Earle, supra note 5, at 232.
126 Inter-American Convention, supra note 7.
'27Telephone interview with John Bowen, U.S. Delegation to the Organization of Ameri-
can States (Apr. 29, 1996); Telephone interview with Paulo Dirosa, Office of the Legal Ad-
viser, U.S. Dep't of State (May 29, 1996).
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March 6, 1997, after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification.
128
As of April 1, 1998, the Inter-American Convention had been ratified by
and is in force for Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Para-
guay, Peru and Venezuela.129 As it becomes more widely adopted in the
western hemisphere, the Inter-American Convention should stand as in-
creasingly significant evidence of multilateral recognition of the corrosive
effect of foreign bribery, particularly by the capital goods importing nations
that form the vast majority of western hemisphere nations, and their will-
ingness to seek, or at least espouse, effective remedies.
A. A Latin American Initiative Against Corruption
Given the United States' long-term interest in international agreements
that would require nations to criminalize foreign corruption, it is perhaps
surprising that the Inter-American Convention was not a U.S. initiative at
the outset. Rather, it was a group of Latin American governments, led by
Venezuela, that first proposed the concept at the Meeting of Western Hemi-
sphere Presidents in Miami in December 1994.130 The United States gave its
strong support to the proposal and encouraged the OAS, at a conference in
Caracas in March 1996, to adopt the Inter-American Convention, which ap-
plies to both the "supply" and the "demand" aspects of the problem by re-
quiring criminalization of both domestic and foreign corruption.
1 31
In retrospect, it seems evident that the Inter-American Convention is,
most of all, a manifestation of the spread of popularly-elected government
in Latin America, which in turn has led to much less patience with, and in
some instances a rejection of, corruption, at least in public. 32 This is re-
flected in the fact that the Convention is not grounded principally on trade
or economic development concerns, but on morality and the need to pre-
serve and protect democratic institutions:
128 Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, art. XXV, 35 I.L.M. at 734; electronic mail
message from Edwin Choy, Secretary for Legal Affairs, Department of International Law,
Organization of American States (July 31, 1997) [hereinafter E-mail from Choy] (on file
with the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
129E-mail from Choy, supra note 128; Telephone interview with Edwin Choy, Secretary
for Legal Affairs, Department of International Law, Organization of American States (Apr.
2, 1998) (confirming the countries ratifying the Inter-American Convention).
130Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Aug. 22, 1997),
supra note 88.
131 Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, arts. VI, VII, VIII, 35 I.L.M. at 729-30.
1
32For example, the recent political crisis in Ecuador, which was brought on at least in
significant part by widespread corruption on the part of the Bucaram government, ultimately
led to the president's ouster. Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Bribes and Customs Delays Lead to Call
for Reforms; Political Crisis is Easing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1997, at A14. The President's
cousin, Rene Bucaram, had publicly suggested that the state telephone company was charg-
ing 10% to 15% of the value of each contract for bribes, and that non-U.S. companies had
obtained 90% of the new business in telecommunications because U.S. firms would not pay
bribes. Id.
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[Rlepresentative democracy, an essential condition for stability, peace
and development of the region, requires, by its nature, the combating of every
form of corruption in the performance of public functions... fighting corrup-
tion strengthens democratic institutions and prevents distortions in the econ-
omy, improprieties in public administration and damage to a society's moral
fiber.... 33
However, the Convention comes at a time when trade within the re-
gion, and foreign investment, are growing at rapid rates; direct foreign in-
vestment flows to Latin America increased by fifty-two percent in 1996
over the prior year.1
3 4
B. Scope and Major Features of the Inter-American Convention
When the Inter-American Convention was concluded in March 1996,
it went much further than any other actual or proposed international agree-
ment in seeking not only to make bribery of foreign officials a crime in the
country of the exporting firm or individuals, but also in encouraging local
governments to deal more effectively with the problem of domestic corrup-
tion. The latter aim appears particularly important given that only two ma-
jor capital goods exporting countries, the United States and Canada, are
members of the OAS, although foreign investment by firms headquartered
in other western hemisphere states, particularly Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
and Venezuela, is increasing.
135
The Inter-American Convention requires the Parties to establish as
criminal offenses, under their domestic laws: the solicitation or acceptance
of illicit payments; the offering of illicit payments; acts or omissions by
government officials for the purpose of obtaining a bribe; fraudulent use of
property derived from such activities; and participation as a principal, ac-
complice, accessory after the fact, etc., in a conspiracy to commit the enu-
merated acts. 36 The Parties also "agree to consider the applicability of
measures within their own institutional systems" to "create, maintain and
strengthen" standards of conduct for their own government officials, define
133 Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, pmbl., 35 I.L.M. at 727.
'34 UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 45, at xxi, 71.
135 0f the approximately 44,500 transnational corporations operating world-wide, ap-
proximately 8,000 or 18%, are headquartered in developing countries, and over one thousand
of these are in Latin America. Id. at 6-7, 32. Of the twenty-five largest transnational corpo-
rations based in developing countries (ranked by foreign assets in 1995), nine are located in
Latin American countries that are signatories to the Inter-American Convention: Mexico (4),
Brazil (3), Argentina (1) and Venezuela (1). Id. at 9.
136 Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, arts. VI, VII, 35 I.L.M. at 729-30. One
possible weakness in the Convention is its definition of "public official" as "any official or
employee of the State or its agencies, including those who have been selected, appointed or
elected to perform activities or functions in the name of the State or in the service of the
State, at any level of its hierarchy." Id. art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 728. It may be that this clause is
intended to cover state or provincial as well as federal government officials in a federal sys-
tem, or that the language simply may be intended to cover all federal officials, regardless of
rank.
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acts of corruption, and provide for methods to enforce the standards of con-
duct. 137 Among other preventive measures is a requirement that the Parties
"consider the applicability of measures to create, maintain and strengthen..
. [l]aws that deny favorable tax treatment for any individual or corporation
for expenditures made in violation of the anticorruption laws of the States
Parties. 138
The Inter-American Convention also provides for the establishment of
the criminal offense of "illicit enrichment," under which an inexplicable
significant increase in the assets of a government official is to be considered
an act of corruption under the Convention in jurisdictions where this is con-
stitutionally permissible.'39 In civil law jurisdictions, if an official is dis-
covered with great wealth that is otherwise inexplicable, there may be a
presumption of criminal guilt. While such an approach would be question-
able in the United States, the concept is important to many Latin American
jurisdictions where investigatory institutions are not always capable of
complex investigations. Moreover, even in the United States, a form of
unjust enrichment is addressed in the "net worth" method of proof used in
prosecuting certain U.S. tax evasion actions.
40
Most significantly in light of the need to control foreign ("transna-
tional") bribery, the Inter-American Convention also requires each state
party, "subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal
system," to
prohibit and punish the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by its na-
tionals, persons having their habitual residence in its territory, and businesses
domiciled there, to a government official of another State, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage, in
connection with any economic or commercial transaction in exchange for any
act or omission in the performance of that official's public functions. 41
This provision is clearly intended to require and facilitate extraterrito-
rial application of the Parties' laws to foreign bribery because "[t]he Con-
vention is applicable provided that the alleged act of corruption as been
committed or has effects in a State Party."' 42 Also, the offenses covered by
the Convention must be treated as extraditable offenses under any existing
extradition treaties that are in force between or among the Parties. 4 3 The
Parties are obligated to provide mutual assistance and technical cooperation
11
7Id. arts. III, VI, 35 I.L.M. at 728-9. The United States, when it ratifies the convention,
may take reservations to certain provisions, such as the crime of "illicit enrichment," since
that crime is not generally recognized under U.S. law.
'38id. art. IV(7), 35 I.L.M. at 729.
391d. art. IX, 35 I.L.M. at 730.
140See 26 U.S.C. § 7201; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, A.B.A. SEC.
INrr'L L. & PRAc. REP., Aug. 1997, at 5, reprinted in 31 INT'L L. 1121, 1126 (1997) [herein-
after ABA Recommendation].
141 Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, art. VIII, 35 I.L.M. at 730.
14 21d. art. IV, 35 I.L.M. at 729 (emphasis added).
1431d. art. XIII(2), 35 I.L.M. at 731.
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to each other in investigating and prosecuting offenses under the Inter-
American Convention, including the furnishing of technical cooperation.
144
In a departure from the FCPA, there is no explicit exception for facili-
tating or "grease" payments.1 45 However, it can be argued that facilitating
payments are not designed to elicit an improper "act or omission" by a gov-
ernment official, but rather to encourage that official to perform a ministe-
rial duty that is a part of his or her normal responsibilities, and therefore are
not covered offenses.
The Inter-American Convention thus follows a multi-pronged approach
that seeks to control both the supply of and demand for bribery. The Parties
accept binding international legal obligations: to criminalize domestic brib-
ery within their own jurisdictions; to strengthen domestic prevention and
detection methodology; to punish foreign bribery by their own officials; and
to improve methods of cooperation among the nations that are parties to the
convention. As one senior U.S. official has suggested, corruption is like
adultery: ninety percent of it is a matter of opportunity. If you eliminate the
opportunities, you eliminate the crime. 146 Even if the Inter-American Con-
vention only assists in reducing the opportunities for foreign bribery, it
would have achieved a significant benefit.
C. Preliminary Assessment of the Inter-American Convention
Whether broad and effective compliance can be achieved, even if the
Inter-American Convention is widely ratified, is necessarily uncertain, as
full implementation and enforcement cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, the
Convention faces some significant shortcomings, including its limited geo-
graphical coverage. Perhaps most significantly, it lacks any mechanism for
resolving disputes among the parties, including a claim by one party that
another is failing to properly carry out its obligations. Nor is there a spe-
cific mechanism under either the Inter-American Convention or within the
OAS framework for monitoring (or creating pressure for) compliance.
When parties adopt the national legislation necessary to implement the In-
ter-American Convention, they are to advise the OAS Secretary General of
that fact.147 However, there is no time limit for such essential implementa-
tion. There is thus a risk that even if the Inter-American Convention is
144Id. art. XIV, 35 I.L.M. at 732.
145 Grease payments are payments to government officials that are designed to "expedite
or secure the performance of a routine governmental action," such as obtaining permits and
licensing, release of goods from the customs authorities, processing governmental papers
such as visas or work permits, providing police protection, mail delivery, utilities hook-ups
and the like. See ABA Recommendation, supra note 140, at 4 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
2(b) (1988)).
146Ambassador Hattie Babbitt, Remarks at the A.B.A. Conference (Feb. 21, 1997) (at-
tributing the remarks to Jim Cheek, former U.S. Ambassador to Argentina).
147 Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, art. X., 35 I.L.M. at 730.
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widely ratified and the majority of American nations become parties, efforts
to ensure national enforcement will prove elusive.
Arguably, one of the most significant benefits of the Inter-American
Convention is its very existence; once it was concluded, it could be, and
was, used as a tool to prod the members of the OECD to take similar ac-
tion.1 48 However, even that benefit has been somewhat reduced in signifi-
cance by the fact that some key members of the OAS, including the United
States, Canada and Brazil, have not promptly ratified the Inter-American
Convention. Despite the Venezuelan initiative behind the Inter-American
Convention, the United States retains a leadership role in the hemisphere,
and it seems evident that some other members of the OAS have not and will
not become parties to the Inter-American Convention unless and until the
United States acts.14 9 Unfortunately, the U.S. ratification process has been
delayed, apparently for technical rather than substantive reasons. 50 The
Clinton Administration finally submitted the Convention to the U.S. Senate
for advice and consent to ratification as a treaty on April 1, 1998.51 While
Senate Foreign Relations Committee action is always difficult to predict,
there appears to be no significant opposition to the Inter-American Con-
vention. r52 An American Bar Association resolution calling for early ratifi-
cation of the Inter-American Convention by the United States and other
signatories may have some positive effect in stimulating prompt Senate ac-
tion once the Convention has been submitted. 5 3 Yet, given the fact that the
OECD Convention was concluded in November 1997 and signed by the
United States and other OECD members in December 1997,1- 4 it may well
148Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88.
149 See id.
IS1 n reviewing the texts prepared by the OAS Secretariat, the United States discovered
differences among the four official versions of the Convention (Spanish, English, Portuguese
and French), which took some time to resolve. Telephone interview with Paulo Dirosa, Of-
fice of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (Jan. 15, 1997).
151 Letter from President William J. Clinton to the U.S. Senate, (Apr. 1, 1998) (transmit-
ting the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, for advice and consent of the U.S.
Senate to ratification) available at <htttp://Iibrary.vhitehouse.gov.cgi-bin>.
152U.S. obligations under the Convention appear to be met by existing U.S. law, princi-
pally the FCPA, so that implementing legislation would not be required. The obligation to
make "illicit enrichment" a crime of corruption is required only of those states that have
"established illicit enrichment as a defense." Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, art.
IX, 35 I.L.M. at 730. Reservations are also generally permitted for specific provisions, al-
lowing the United States to reserve on "grease payments" should it determine this to be ad-
visable. See id. art. XXIV, 35 I.L.M at 733. Moreover, even those members of the Foreign
Relations Committee who are generally unenthusiastic about international treaties may feel
that an international accord that outlaws "corruption" is a good idea, particularly when it is a
step toward creating a more level playing field for U.S. businesses.
153 See ABA Recommendation, supra note 140.
'-4Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88. Australia, which must resolve certain federal-state issues, was the only mem-
ber to fail to sign the agreement. Id.
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be that the U.S. Senate will ultimately wish to consider the two conventions
simultaneously, which may result in further delays to U.S. ratification of the
Inter-American Convention.
The position of Canada, as the only other developed, capital goods ex-
porting country in the hemisphere, is also important in terms of obtaining
broad hemispheric accession. Canada appears to support the Inter-
American Convention generally, and has announced that it will sign the In-
ter-American Convention, but will not do so until an internal review is
completed.1
55
Other major weaknesses of the Inter-American Convention, albeit ones
that are no fault of the agreement itself, are geography and coverage. The
European Union nations, Japan, Korea and other major non-western hemi-
spheric capital goods exporting nations have no strong incentive to cooper-
ate in the OAS scheme, even though the Inter-American Convention is
explicitly made open to accession by any state, not simply by members of
the OAS. 56 Prior to the conclusion of the OECD Convention, the U.S.
government might have pressured capital goods exporting states from out-
side the western hemisphere to become bound by the Inter-American Con-
vention's obligations. The adherence of such nations to the Inter-American
Convention's disciplines, at least for their individual and corporate citizens'
activities in Latin America, would increase the value of the instrument, par-
ticularly for the majority of Latin American states, which cannot be ex-
pected to adhere to the OECD Convention in the immediate future.
However, the United States can be expected to focus on seeking broad,
prompt ratification of the OECD Convention, which if in force, will cover
most of the world's major capital goods exporting nations. Perhaps Argen-
tina, Mexico, Venezuela and the other major capital goods importing coun-
tries in the hemisphere who have become parties to the Inter-American
Convention will be able to exert pressure on non-hemispheric investors.
Such pressure would be in these nations' interests because accession to the
Inter-American Convention would facilitate internal efforts to control cor-
ruption, and further demonstrate to the world the seriousness of the efforts
of the Latin American democracies.
In the end, the critical issues relating to the Inter-American Convention
will be ratification by the OAS members who have not yet done so, enact-
ment of implementing legislation, and enforcement. It is too soon to tell
whether these essential stages will be addressed effectively by the region's
nations. It may be that the Inter-American Convention's long-term signifi-
cance will lie in its importance as a statement by democratic capital goods
'55Telephone interview with Douglas Breithaupt, Esq., Canadian Ministry of Justice
(Jan. 17, 1997). Apparently, no significant progress has been made toward Canadian ratifi-
cation in the past year.
56Ilnter-American Convention, supra note 7, art. XXIII, 35 I.L.M. at 733 (stating that
"this Convention shall remain open for accession by any other State" although initial signa-
ture was reserved for OAS members under article XXI).
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importing nations of their concern over bribery and their willingness to
move in the direction of effective measures to deal with the problem. For
those nations, the Inter-American Convention is an important interim step
and a useful tool in convincing the members of the OECD and non-member
adherents that multilateral approaches are feasible and that they should take
similar action.1
57
VI. THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions adopted by the OECD on November
21, 1997 ("OECD Convention"), 58 represents the most significant effort to
date of the world community to deal on a multilateral basis with the prob-
lem of foreign corruption, mainly because the OECD members are home to
most of the multinational corporations. 159 Moreover, while the developed
members of the OECD are the major capital goods exporting nations of the
world, they are also the major capital goods importing nations. Of total
global foreign direct investment flows of $350 billion in 1996, only thirty-
four percent went to developing nations;' 60 the rest went to developed na-
tions, essentially all of whom are members of the OECD. However, the
OECD Convention did not develop in isolation. Rather, its development
can be traced in part to the efforts of the United States, actions of other
public and private institutions, and the impetus provided by the Inter-
American Convention. The OECD Convention represents a significant step
toward the globalization of the foreign bribery problem, although much re-
mains to be done within the OECD "club," including the elimination of the
tax deduction in the capital goods exporting country for foreign bribery
payments.
A. Antecedents of the OECD Convention
The OECD, an organization of twenty-nine primarily highly developed
nations,16 1 has been engaged in multilateral efforts to deal with foreign cor-
ruption since at least 1994. In May 1994, it adopted the Recommendations
1
57Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88.
158OECD Convention, supra note 8.
1
590f the 44,508 multinational corporations (as defined by UNCTAD), 33,548, or 75%,
are located in Western Europe, Japan and the United States. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note
45, at 3.
"6Id. at 5.
1'6 The current OECD membership consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
See About OECD: Member Countries (last modified Dec. 11, 1997)
<http:/Avww.oecd.org/about/member-countries.html>.
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on Bribery in International Business Transactions ("Recommendations on
Bribery") which call upon member countries "to take effective measures to
deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connec-
tion with international business transactions."16 2 Among the approaches to
be considered in the ensuing three and a half years were a convention on
foreign bribery,163 eliminating income tax deductions for corrupt payments
made overseas,164 and steps to discourage corruption as a part of bilateral
development assistance funding. 165 However, until 1997, concrete progress
had been agonizingly slow despite a multitude of reports and recommenda-
tions, and there had been only limited movement toward most of these
goals.
An OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Trans-
actions ("OECD Working Group"), under strong U.S. government pressure,
has been involved in OECD efforts to promote multilateral actions against
foreign corruption. Created in 1994, the OECD Working Group had for
some time been considering an agreement which would require OECD
member countries to criminalize foreign bribery.166 The OECD Working
Group originated the terms of reference adopted by the OECD ministers in
May 1997 that ultimately became the basis of the OECD Convention.
167
The non-binding Recommendations on Bribery began the process under
which the OECD inched closer to requiring the governments of countries
whose firms compete in the international marketplace to rein in the use of
corrupt payments as a tool of obtaining foreign business. At its May 1997
ministerial meeting, the OECD ministers condemned foreign bribery in
clear and unequivocal terms by stating:
Bribery in international business is another key issue in an increasingly
interdependent world economy. Bribery hinders competition, distorts trade and
harms consumers, taxpayers and the efficient honest traders who lose con-
162 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Council Recommendation
on Bribery in International Business Transactions, May 27, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1389, 1390
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in International Business Transac-
tions].163 OECD Convention, supra note 8.
"6Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Offi-
cials, Apr. 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1311 (1996).
165 See Note by the Secretary General to the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, OECD
Actions to Fight Corruption, Part II: Bribery in Aid-Funded Procurement May 26, 1997,
<http://www.oecd.org/DAF/CMIS/bribery.htm#I>.
166 Some Developing Countries Urge Criminalizing Bribery of Officials, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA), at D7 (Mar. 22, 1995).
167 See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Revised Recommen-
dation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions May 23,
1997,36 I.L.M. 1016 (1997) [hereinafter Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery].
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tracts, production and profits. It can also undermine public support for gov-
ernment.
168
After several delays, and under the unrelenting pressure of the United
States,169 the Council of the OECD at the Ministerial level also committed
its members to conclude the negotiation of a convention to criminalize for-
eign bribery by the end of 1997, as an appropriate means of assuring "mul-
tilateral co-operation, monitoring and follow-up. ' 170  This action was far
more than a simple hortatory declaration. It reflected the adoption of a de-
tailed and highly specific Council recommendation, which included an an-
nexed list of Agreed Common Elements of Criminal Legislation and
Related Action'7 ' ("Common Elements") to serve as a basis for negotiation
of an international convention. These Common Elements included defini-
tions of such terms as foreign public official, limitations on defenses, a plea
for a broad territorial base for the exercise of jurisdiction by the home
country of the bribing company, and the use of effective criminal penalties
as sanctions. 172 They called for establishment of jurisdiction over bribery
"when the offense is committed in whole or in part in the prosecuting
state's territory." 173 This language appeared to cover the situation in which
a foreigner bribes another nation's official while in the United States, a
situation not currently covered by the FCPA or by U.S. statutes punishing
bribery of U.S. government officials. Nations which exercise criminal ju-
risdiction on the basis of nationality were urged to do so for foreign bribery
as well; those which do not prosecute on the basis of nationality are urged
to extradite nationals who bribe foreign public officials. 174 The Common
Elements also recommended criminal penalties, effective and independent
enforcement, punishment of related accounting or money laundering viola-
tions, and international cooperation. 7s
'OECD, Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, Communiqug, 29 (May 26-27,
1997) <http://www.oecdwash.org/PRESS/PRESRELS/nevs9745.htm> [hereinafter OECD
Ministerial Communique'].
169Nicholas Bray, OECD Ministers Agree to Ban Bribery as a Means for Companies to
Win Business, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1997, at A2.
170 OECD Ministerial Communiqui, supra note 168; see also Revised Recommendation
on Combating Bribery, supra note 167, at 1019.
171 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Council, Agreed Common
Elements of Criminal Legislation and Related Action, May 29, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1016, 1023-
24 (1997) annexed to Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery, supra note 167
[hereinafter Common Elements].
'721d. 1, 36 I.L.M. at 1023.
'73 Id. 4, 36 I.L.M. at 1023.
174Id.
17"5 d. 5-8, 36 I.L.M. at 1023-24.
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B. Scope and Coverage of the OECD Convention
Negotiation of the OECD Convention began in July 1997 and was
completed that November. 176 The resulting text, which was signed in De-
cember 1997 and now awaits ratification,' , is, despite some relatively mi-
nor shortcomings, a major achievement in efforts to establish binding
international obligations requiring the punishment of foreign bribery.
178
The OECD Convention, as its name suggests, deals only with "com-
bating bribery of foreign public officials."' Unlike the Inter-American
Convention, the OECD Convention does not purport to require the parties
to criminalize bribery of their own public officials, although presumably all
or most OECD members already do so. Its principal operative obligation,
clearly reflecting the influence of the FCPA, is:
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that
it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer,
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or
through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a
third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other im-
proper advantage in the conduct of international business.1
80
Complicity, aiding and abetting are to be criminal offenses; attempt
and conspiracy are crimes to the same extent as under a Party's domestic
law.
181
The term "foreign public official" includes "any person holding a leg-
islative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country" or "exercis-
ing a public function" and extends to officials of public international
organizations.8 2  Significantly, the definition, despite all efforts by the
United States, 183 does not include political party officials. This exclusion
was a major disappointment to U.S. officials,'8 who believed that exclud-
ing political party officials would create a huge loophole for foreign coun-
tries, which could then channel illicit payments to party officials rather than
government officials. However, other governments apparently wished to
176 U.S. Departments of Commerce, State, and Justice, Summary of OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, INT'L LAW. NEws, Winter 1998, at 10 [hereinafter Summary] (on file with the
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
177Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88.
178 "The convention is a historic achievement in the fight against bribery." Summary, su-
pra note 176, at 10.
179OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 1, 37 I.L.M. at 4.
"OId. art. 1(1), 37 I.L.M. at 4.
1811d. art. 1(2), 37 I.L.M. at 4.
1821d. art. 1(4), 37 I.L.M. at 4.
'83Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88.
1841d.
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avoid an agreement that seeks broadly to cover "trading in influence.' 85
Whether this exclusion significantly weakens the OECD Convention is
open to question. 186 In any event, the OECD Council has adopted an accel-
erated "work plan" to analyze various means of dealing with political party
officials and political candidates.
187
Each Party to the OECD Convention is required to impose "effective,
proportionate and dissuasive" criminal penalties for foreign bribery, in-
cluding the deprivation of liberty, comparable to those applicable to bribery
of a Party's own officials under national law.' If legal persons are not
subject to criminal penalties under national law, "effective, proportionate
and dissuasive" non-criminal sanctions must be imposed.18 9 The bribe and
the proceeds are to be subject to seizure and confiscation.190
Jurisdiction is one of the more complex aspects of any convention re-
quiring its parties to impose criminal liability on an extraterritorial basis. 19'
The United States, as noted earlier, exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction un-
der the FCPA based on a nexus with the United States, i.e., utilization of
"the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce."'
92
Other countries, such as France, exercise jurisdiction on the basis of nation-
ality, meaning that the country has jurisdiction anywhere its nationals are
located.' 3 Consequently, the OECD Convention offers alternative bases for
jurisdiction:
1. Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish
its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is
committed in whole or in part in its territory.
2. Each Party which has jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals for of-
fenses committed abroad shall take such measures as may be necessary to es-
tablish its jurisdiction to do so in respect of the bribery of a foreign public
official, according to the same principles.
9 4
185Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Aug. 22, 1997),
supra note 88.
186At least one prominent American attorney, a former member of the State Depart-
ment's Office of the Legal Adviser, who has dealt with FCPA issues in his practice for sev-
eral decades, indicates that he is not aware of any case in which the payment has been made
to a party official rather than to an official of the foreign government. See Interview with 0.
Thomas Johnson, Esq., Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 23, 1997) [hereinafter
Interview with 0. Thomas Johnson] (on file with the Northwestern Journal of International
Law & Business).
187Summary, supra note 176, at 10.
188OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 3(l), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
189Id. art. 3(2), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
9 ' Id. art. 3(3), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
191 See discussion of Common Elements, supra Part VI.A.
19215 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a), -2(a) (1994).
193 Interview with 0. Thomas Johnson, supra note 186.
194OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(l)-(2), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
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Parties agree to exercise jurisdiction without regard to "considerations
of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with an-
other State or the identity of the natural or legal persons involved."'1 95 In
other words, the law, not politics or economics, is to be determinative.
Because the FCPA currently applies only to "domestic concerns," the
FCPA must be amended to comply with the OECD Convention so that the
FCPA covers all foreign persons who meet the jurisdictional requirements
of U.S. law, i.e., make corrupt foreign payments using instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, including U.S. citizens and firms acting outside the
United States. 196 This means, for example, that a European businessperson
offering a bribe to a Venezuelan diplomat while both are present in Miami
should be subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction, as would a Mexican busi-
nessperson in Mexico offering a bribe to an Argentine government official
while both are present in Mexico (or Argentina) if the funds were trans-
ferred by wire or facsimile instructions through Citibank in New York,
197
even though U.S. persons or "domestic concerns" are not involved in those
transactions.
The OECD Convention, unlike the Inter-American Convention which
is silent on the subject, contains FCPA-like provisions to address account-
ing mechanisms that can be used to combat the concealment of foreign
payments. Each Party
shall take such measures as may be necessary, within the framework of its
laws and regulations regarding the maintenance of books and records, financial
statement disclosures, and accounting and auditing standards, to prohibit the
establishment of off-the-books accounts, the making of off-the-books or inade-
quately identified transactions, the recording of non-existent expenditures, the
entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of their object, as well as the
use of false documents, by companies subject to those laws and regulations, for
the purpose of bribing foreign public officials or of hiding such bribery.'
9 s
The limitation "within the framework of its laws and regulations" pre-
sumably allows countries such as the United States to continue to apply the
accounting restrictions of the FCPA only to companies subject to regulation
by the SEC.
The OECD Convention provides that bribery is to be an extraditable
offence, as under the Inter-American Convention, and the OECD Conven-
tion may serve as the basis for extradition if a treaty is required.' 99 If a
195ld. art. 5, 37 I.L.M. at 5.
'9615 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. Implementing legislation reflecting these and other changes was
sent to Congress on May 4, 1998. OECD: To Comply with OECD Pact, Clinton Seeks to
Amend Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) at D3 (May 15, 1998).
197 See Interview with 0. Thomas Johnson, supra note 186.
198 OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 8(1), 37 I.L.M. at 5. Appropriate penalties are
also required. Id. art. 8(2), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
'99Id. art. 10(l)-(2), 37 I.L.M. at 6; Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, art.
XIII(2)-(3), 35 I.L.M. at 731.
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party does not extradite its own nationals, it must be able to prosecute its
nationals for offenses committed by them abroad. °0
Among the most significant aspects of the OECD Convention are the
mechanisms for facilitating monitoring and compliance. The OECD
Working Group201 is to be the vehicle for "a programme of systematic fol-
low-up to monitor and promote the full implementation of this Conven-
tion.,,202 Mutual legal assistance is obligatory.20 3 For example, one party's
law enforcement officials, when provided with information suggesting a
violation of another party's foreign bribery laws, would be required to co-
operate in an investigation, including providing "the requesting Party, with-
out delay, of any additional information or documents needed to support the
request for assistance and, where requested, of the status and outcome of the
request for assistance. ''2°4
While any monitoring mechanism is only as effective as the will of the
participants to make it work, there should be a strong incentive for the par-
ties, driven by their firms and competitive circumstances, to pressure other
parties to comply with the OECD Convention's requirements so as to es-
tablish a level playing field. In the author's view, one may reasonably ex-
pect that when national firms learn of illicit activities by their private sector
competitors abroad, they will advise their own governments, which can
then invoke the mutual assistance provisions or demand discussions in the
OECD Working Group. The combination of institutionalized monitoring
and mutual legal assistance is potentially a powerful set of tools to assure
that once the OECD Convention is implemented through ratification and
enactment of national legislation, the parties will comply with their obliga-
tions.
The OECD members' concern with competitive pressures has led to an
unusual, if not unique, mechanism for ratification and entry into force.
While the OECD currently numbers twenty-nine Party States, the OECD
Convention is not intended to enter into force until sixty days after five of
the ten OECD countries with the greatest volume of exports, who represent
at least sixty percent of the total exports of the ten countries, have deposited
their instruments of ratification.0 5 This means that regardless of the actions
200OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 10(3), 37 I.L.M. at 6.201 See supra text accompanying note 166.
202Id. art. 12. Operating costs have been provided through the normal OECD budget
process. See OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 8, 11
(1997).203OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 9(1), 37 I.L.M. at 6.204id.
205OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 15(1) (Annex), 37 I.L.M. at 7. According to the
Annex, the ten leading exporters, in order of total export volume are: United States (15.9%);
Germany (14.1%); Japan (11.8%); France (7.7%); United Kingdom (6.7%); Italy (6.2%);
Canada (5.1%); Korea (4.5%); Netherlands (4.5%); Belgium-Luxembourg (4.4%). Based on
the 1996 Annex data, these ten countries account for 8 1.0% of OECD exports.
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of the remaining OECD countries, the OECD Convention will not go into
force until at least half of the major capital goods exporting countries, the
United States, Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada,
Korea, Netherlands, and Belgium-Luxembourg, have deposited their ratifi-
cations. If the top three exporting countries, the United States, Germany,
and Japan, ratify the OECD Convention then any two of the remaining
seven will provide sufficient export volume to meet the sixty percent re-
quirement. However, if Germany, Japan, and France all fail to act, the
OECD Convention could not enter into force, since these three countries
account for more than forty percent of the total exports of the ten coun-
tries.206
Notwithstanding this mechanism, if the OECD Convention has not
entered into force by December 31, 1998, then it will enter into force when
at least two signatories have deposited their instruments of ratification and
declared their willingness to be bound by the OECD Convention's provi-
sions.207 Given the competitive concerns among major OECD members, it
seems unlikely that any of the major exporting nations would opt for this
approach to ratification and entry into force, although the United States has
nothing to lose by doing so since its nationals are already bound by the
strictures of the FCPA.
This somewhat unwieldy ratification mechanism makes it unlikely that
any of the major capital goods exporting countries, except the United States
with the existing FCPA, will be bound by the OECD Convention's stric-
tures against foreign bribery unless most of their major competitors in for-
eign markets are also bound. It is entirely possible that the major OECD
members, once they have completed their respective constitutional proc-
esses, will make arrangements to deposit their instruments of ratifications
simultaneously with the OECD secretariat. 0 8 The Convention is open to
signature by OECD members and by non-members who are participants in
the OECD Working Group.
209
The OECD Convention was promptly signed by all OECD members
except Australia at a ceremony on December 17, 1997.210 Five non-OECD
members, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Slovakia and Bulgaria, who had been
members of the OECD Working Group and participated fully in the nego-
tiation of the OECD Convention, also signed on that date.211 The involve-
ment of non-OECD nations as full Parties, particularly major capital goods
importing nations such as Brazil, is crucial if the OECD Convention is to be
206id"
207 1d. art. 15(2), 37 I.L.M. at 7.
208Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88.209OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 13(1), 37 I.L.M. at 6.
21°Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88.2 1lid.
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accepted as a truly global accord. Discussions regarding possible signature
and accession have reportedly taken place between OECD members and
South Africa as well as with several Asian nations.212
While in most cases involving international treaties, at least several
years would likely pass before a significant number of signatory nations
would ratify the agreement and become obligated by its provisions, the
OECD Convention may be an exception. The OECD ministers in May
1997, in anticipation of the negotiation of the Convention, recommended to
the member governments that each "should criminalize the bribery of for-
eign public officials by submitting legislative proposals" to its respective
congress or parliament by April 1, 1998, and seek enactment of the legisla-
tion by the end of 1998. 13 This resolution relating to domestic legislation
offers a pressure point for strong proponents of the OECD Convention,
such as the United States, to encourage the other signatories to ratify it
promptly, assuming of course that the United States itself is able to com-
plete its own constitutional requirements more quickly than has been the
case with the Inter-American Convention. President Clinton submitted the
OECD Convention to the Senate on May 1, 1998.214 If the U.S. Senate acts
promptly, other OECD member nations are also likely to act promptly. If
ratification by the United States is delayed for any reason, other OECD
members will defer their ratifications as well, even though the United States
has already implemented most of its OECD Convention obligations through
the FCPA.21s
C. Preliminary Assessment of the OECD Convention
The OECD Convention shows great promise as an effective interna-
tional instrument for reducing foreign bribery. It can be expected to obli-
gate all major capital goods exporting countries to punish foreign bribery
among persons within their national jurisdictions, and to include many ma-
jor capital goods importing countries as well. Obligations under the OECD216
Convention are generally clear and unequivocal. Monitoring of compli-
212id.
2 3 0ECD, Ministerial Communiqui, supra note 168, 29; see Revised Recommendation
on Combating Bribery, supra note 167, Part III, 36 I.L.M. at 1019. The April I date was in-
tentionally chosen to encourage initial action on the national front before the OECD ministe-
rial meeting traditionally held in May. Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S.
government official (Aug. 22, 1997), supra note 88.214Letter from President William J. Clinton to the U.S. Senate, (May 1, 1998) (transmit-
ting the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, for advice and consent of the U.S. Senate to ratification)
available at <htttp://library.whitehouse.gov.cgi-bin>.
215Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88.216 For example, "[tlhe bribery of a foreign public official shall be punishable by effec-
tive, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties." OECD Convention, supra note 8, art.
3(1), 37 I.L.M. at 5.
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ance will be facilitated by the existing OECD Working Group,2 17 and mu-
tual legal assistance provisions218 should make it easier for one party to
pressure another to cooperate when likely instances of bribery by one party
are discovered by another party.
The OECD Convention also has its shortcomings. For example, it does
not establish obligations relating to laws punishing domestic bribery. Be-
cause the nations who become parties are all capital goods importing na-
tions, it might have been more significant if the demand side as well as the
supply side of foreign bribery were covered by the OECD Convention.
This was, at a minimum, a lost opportunity to make domestic bribery sub-
ject to the monitoring and mutual assistance mechanisms established in the
OECD Convention, unless the domestic bribery for one party is foreign
bribery by another. There remains a loophole for payments to foreign po-
litical parties and party officials, 219 although this may be cured in time if the
current work plan220 to deal with that issue is successful. It is also regretta-
ble that the OECD Convention does not obligate the parties to eliminate the
deduction under national tax laws for foreign bribery payments, particularly
in light of earlier and current OECD efforts to deal with the problem.22'
D. Eliminating Government Subsidization of Foreign Bribery
It is notable that in a significant number of OECD member nations,
foreign bribes are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses222
on a company or individual's income tax returns. The outrageousness of
this tax deduction has perhaps not received the attention it deserves. By
providing firms that bribe with a tax subsidy, the affected OECD govern-
ments have effectively been encouraging, aiding and abetting foreign brib-
ery, and their taxpayers are paying the cost. For example, in a situation
where the corporate tax rate is thirty-five percent and foreign bribes are de-
ductible from taxable income as a business expense, thirty-five out of every
one hundred marks or francs used for foreign bribes is effectively supplied
by the respective governments. Government support of criminal activity by
its citizens abroad is tolerated in few other areas, except in wartime; why
should it be acceptable in the name of furthering exports?
For obvious reasons, such tax policies have long been criticized. For
example, a former president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, has suggested that
2171d. art. 13, 37 I.L.M. at 6.
2111d. art. 9, 37 I.L.M. at 6.
219"[T]he text does not specifically cover political parties. . . ." Summary, supra note
176, at 10.
20id.
2'See infra Part VI.D.
2nThese members include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Lux-
emburg, Netherlands, Portugal, New Zealand and Switzerland. See Report by the OECD
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) May 26,
1997, <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/briminrp.htm>.
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by permitting their firms to deduct foreign bribes, home governments are
essentially "taking no notice of developing countries' anti-corruption
laws." 223 The members of the OECD finally agreed in 1996 that they would
rewrite their tax laws to eliminate the current tax deductions for payments
made to bribe foreign officials, although no time limit for such action was
22set. 24 The OECD Ministers in May 1997 again urged "prompt implemen-
tation" of this recommendation. 225 At a June 1997 meeting, the Group of
Seven nations, consisting of the United States, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, with the European Commission and
Russia also participating, endorsed in principle the OECD proposals to
eliminate the tax deduction for foreign bribery and to conclude a convention
on the tax subject.226 Still, as of May 1997, eleven OECD members contin-
ued to provide a tax deduction for foreign payments.22 7 More recently, two
of the major holdouts, France and Germany, have introduced to their re-
spective parliaments the legislation necessary to eliminate the tax deduction
for foreign bribery payments; this legislation will take effect when each na-
tion becomes a party to the OECD Convention.228 Norway, Belgium, Den-
mark and Australia have also enacted or proposed legislation to deny the
tax deductibility of foreign bribes.2 29 While it seems likely that the vast
majority of OECD members will soon have laws that prevent the tax de-
ductibility of foreign bribes, the effectiveness of such legislation remains
uncertain. For example, questions arise as to whether the prohibitions will
be limited to taxpayers who have been charged or convicted of foreign
bribes, or if they will be linked to the accounting provisions of the OECD
Convention. Thus, it may be some time before this generous government
subsidy to foreign corruption can be eliminated or at least substantially re-
duced.
E. Foreign Corruption Associated with Assistance Contracts
While maintenance of tax deductibility for foreign bribery constitutes a
government contribution to foreign corrupt payments, the situation with
procurement in assistance contracts goes one step further. If a government
tolerates the use by its contractors of government funds to bribe foreign of-
ficials, the home government is supplying all rather than just some of the
223Some Developing Countries Urge Criminalizing Bribery of Officials, supra note 166,
at D7.224Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Offi-
cials, supra note 164.
225 0ECD Ministerial Communiqui, supra note 168.
226Bribery Pact, Investment in Africa to Figure in Talks at Denver Summit, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA), at D2 (June 12, 1997).
227 See supra note 222.228Telephone interview with knowledgeable U.S. government official (Dec. 30, 1997),
supra note 88.
2291994 Recommendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions, supra note
162, at 2.
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illicit funds. The OECD recommended to its members in May 1996 that
each nation include anti-corruption provisions in contracts providing for
bilateral economic assistance. ° According to the OECD's Development
Assistance Committee, since 1996, with the exception of France and Ger-
many, all OECD members that did not already include such provisions ei-
ther have, or are about to introduce such language. 231' Australia, for
example, is now including the following language in its anti-corruption
provisions:
The contractor will not make or cause to be made any offer, gift or pay-
ment, consideration or benefit of any kind, which would or could be construed
as an illegal or corrupt practice, either directly or indirectly to any party, as an
inducement or reward in relation to the execution of this contract. Any such
practice will be grounds for termination of this contract.
232
The existence of such language in assistance contracts does not in itself
assure that corrupt payments will be discouraged. Only enforcement by the
national governments of the governments' rights of termination are likely to
cause a change in company practice. However, the willingness of most
OECD governments to eliminate the tax deduction for foreign bribes, and
their support, through national legislation and enforcement, of the provi-
sions of an international convention against bribery, may increase the like-
lihood that national firms will respect such contract language.
VII. THE FUTURE
As suggested in the Introduction to this article, the process of global-
izing sanctions against foreign bribery, which may ultimately lead to a re-
duction in the incidence of such bribery, is a multi-step process. Most key
governments and private business groups appear to have been convinced
that the issue needs to be effectively addressed by the international commu-
nity. The need for binding international agreements that deal with foreign
bribery on a multilateral basis, has largely been met with the conclusion of
the Inter-American and OECD Conventions. While both Conventions have
their shortcomings, 233 any reasonable observer would agree that the current
prospects for effectively attacking foreign corruption are far improved from
even two years ago. However, much remains to be done if the Conventions
are to have a real and lasting impact on discouraging foreign bribery. The
230 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Development Assistance
Committee Recommendation on Anti-Corruption Proposals for Aid-Funded Procurement, at
2, (May 1997),
<http://www.oecd.org/DAF/CMIS/bribdac.htm#Annex I>.23 1 id.
232 Id. at 4.
233The shortcomings of the Inter-American Convention include limited coverage and the
absence of any monitoring mechanism. See supra Part V.C. The shortcomings of the OECD
Convention include the failure to require implementation and enforcement of local anti-
bribery statutes, and the failure to include coverage of corrupt payments to political party of-
ficials. See supra Part VI.C.
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will of the United States and the world community, in both public and pri-
vate sectors, to address the problem will be tested by what remains to be ac-
complished: obtaining broad ratification of the two Conventions by the
Latin American and OECD governments; enactment of national imple-
menting legislation criminalizing foreign bribery; and securing enforcement
through effective international monitoring, cooperation among law en-
forcement agencies, peer pressure, and other means. Unless and until this
occurs, U.S. companies will remain at the same competitive disadvantage as
in the twenty years since enactment of the FCPA, and the adverse impact of*
corruption on economic development and democratic government will con-
tinue.
In this area, as in so many others, the conclusion and ratification of in-
ternational agreements and the enactment of national legislation punishing
domestic and foreign bribery do not in themselves guarantee any degree of
success. After all, even the most corrupt nations in the world have national
legislation purporting to punish the offering or soliciting of bribes, and with
the exception of recent United Nations General Assembly resolutions, 34
developing nations in Africa and Asia have shown little enthusiasm for in-
ternational efforts to deal with the problem of corruption.
The progress toward effective multilateral approaches to foreign brib-
ery has been spearheaded by the United States, and future progress is likely
to require equal or stronger persuasion. The most significant step the U.S.
government can take to further its campaign against foreign bribery, now
that both the Inter-American Convention and the OECD Convention have
been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, is to
work for prompt Senate action. Until the United States is a party to the In-
ter-American Convention, it is unlikely that the other major nations in the
hemisphere will adhere to the Convention. Because of the trade-weighted
ratification process for the OECD Convention and competitive concerns
among capital goods exporting OECD members, the OECD Convention is
unlikely to enter into force until the United States has deposited or is pre-
pared to deposit its own instrument of ratification. The delay in ratifying
the Inter-American Convention has undermined U.S. credibility among
western hemisphere nations.235 A delay in ratifying the OECD Convention
can be expected to have an even more serious impact among the United
States' capital goods exporting competitors.
Adherence to the OECD Convention by major non-OECD members,
particularly the significant capital goods importing nations in Latin America
and Asia that have not already participated, should be strongly encouraged.
Hopefully, the Latin American nations will take the lead, with U.S. support,
in encouraging non-westem hemisphere capital goods exporting countries
to become parties to the Inter-American Convention. This would help to
23 4 See supra Part III.B.
235See supra Part V.C.
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ensure that, at least in Latin America, developed "supply" nations as well as
developing "demand" nations, would be bound to work together to combat
corruption. Also, if adherence to one of the conventions is not deemed ap-
propriate, the United States could urge such governments to enact national
legislation similar to the FCPA.
Beyond assuring that both the Inter-American and OECD Conventions
are widely adhered to, and that national implementation is promptly en-
acted, there are clearly a number of other steps the United States and other
like-minded governments can take to increase the likelihood that the new
conventions will have an impact on foreign bribery. Once both conventions
have been broadly ratified, emphasis should shift to the monitoring and en-
forcement process. The OECD Working Group is responsible for monitor-
ing and enforcement under the OECD Convention;236 it would be desirable
to create a similar working group at the OAS to perform oversight and
monitoring functions. It seems likely that once a majority of the world's
capital goods exporting nations have criminalized foreign bribery through
national legislation consistent with the OECD and Inter-American Conven-
tions, the competitive pressures of the marketplace are likely to cause the
members of the private sector to inform their governments when a foreign
competitor is suspected of offering or paying a bribe. Both Conventions
contain mutual assistance provisions.237 These should be used aggressively
from the outset. Once it becomes clear that the risk of detection and prose-
cution has increased, bribery by private firms may become less common.
The United States should also keep in mind that its success in con-
vincing other nations in the western hemisphere or in the OECD to enact
legislation that is extraterritorial in nature may be affected by other U.S.
trade policies and legal initiatives. The willingness of such key nations as
Canada, Japan and the European Union nations to apply their criminal laws
in an extraterritorial manner, even voluntarily, may be compromised by
U.S. efforts under the Helms-Burton legislation to expand the extraterrito-
rial application of its laws to non-U.S. companies investing in Cuba, or by
threats - recently ameliorated - to punish non-U.S. firms that trade with
Iran.
238
The World Bank and other international financial institutions should
consider conditioning further lending on adherence by debtor governments
to one or other of the Conventions, and condition participation in overseas
development projects by firms on their governments' adherence to the Con-
ventions and enactment of national enforcement legislation. If it becomes
apparent in a few years that significant numbers of capital goods importing
nations outside the Americas and Europe are not adhering to either Con-
2
6OECD Convention, supra note 8, art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 6.
2371d. art. 937, I.L.M. at 6; Inter-American Convention, supra note 7, art. XIV, 35 I.L.M.
at 732.
238 See discussion supra note 60.
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vention, a supplemental convention covering both foreign and domestic
bribery should be negotiated, perhaps under United Nations auspices.
Even with broad acceptance of the Inter-American and OECD Con-
ventions by major capital goods exporting and capital goods importing na-
tions, there will inevitably be governments and private entities that will
refuse to cooperate. However, broad acceptance and enforcement of the
Conventions' principles by the international community, including the in-
temational financial institutions, can be expected to make the tacit refusal of
some governments to enforce domestic bribery laws more difficult. Ulti-
mately, the sheer variety and intensity of international initiatives to deal
with the problem, both among governments and within the private sector,
and a growing understanding among the peoples of the world that the costs
to everyone except the recipients are simply too great to tolerate, will have a
positive impact, in creating
[A]n environment in which a new generation of political and business leader-
ship can believe that it is possible to do business and to govern without taking
bribes, where politicians know they will be held accountable for their honesty,
and where business executives believe in integrity as passionately as they be-
lieve in profits. This is not some missionary's dream but a hard-nosed recog-
nition that our ambitions for global growth and prosperity depend upon it.
23 9
239 R. Michael Gadbav, International Anticorruption Initiatives: Today's Fad or Tonor-
row'sNew World?, AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 111, 115 (1997).
